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Abstract When do we judge that someone was forced to do what they did? One
relatively well-established finding is that subjects tend to judge that agents were not
forced to do actions when those actions violate norms. A surprising discovery of
Young & Phillips 2011 is that this effect seems to disappear when we frame the
relevant ‘force’-claim in the active rather than passive voice (pX forced Y to ϕq vs.
pY was forced to ϕ by Xq). Young and Phillips found a similar contrast when the
scenario itself shifts attention from Y (the forcee) to X (the forcer). We propose that
these effects can be (at least partly) explained by way of the role of attention in the
setting of quantifier domains which in turn play a role in the evaluation of ‘force’-
claims. We argue for this hypothesis by way of an experiment which shows that
sequences of active vs. passive ‘force’-claims display the characteristic “stickiness”
of quantifier domain expansion, using a paradigm which we argue provides a useful
general paradigm for testing quantifier domain hypotheses. Finally, we sketch a
semantics for ‘force’ which we argue is suitable for capturing these effects.
Keywords: moral psychology, ‘force’, quantifier domains, experimental semantics and
pragmatics, Knobe effect
1 Introduction
A wide variety of studies in recent years have shown that judgments about morality
have surprising ramifications in apparently distinct conceptual domains, in particular
having to do with causality and intentionality. Among other things, judgments about
morality influence judgments about whether someone was forced to do what they
did. In this paper we aim to improve our understanding of this phenomenon by
making a case study of subtle variations in these judgments identified by Young
& Phillips (2011). We argue that these judgments are best explained by way of a
hypothesis which connects judgments about ‘force’ to quantification over a domain
which we call a causal background: a set of propositions which represent the causal
structure of a particular situation. The more causes we take into account, the more
likely we are to judge that someone was forced to do what they did.
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2 The basic effect
Moral judgments influence intuitions about ostensibly non-moral issues in surpris-
ing, and now well-documented, ways (this is sometimes called the Knobe effect
after Knobe 2003; see 2010 for a review). While the basic intuition behind these
phenomena can be see at least as early as Aristotle (NE 1110a8-9), an explosion
of recent empirical work has shown that people’s moral judgments influence their
ordinary assessments of whether or not an agent acted intentionally (Knobe 2003;
Leslie, Knobe & Cohen 2006; Cova 2016), whether an agent caused a given outcome
(Alicke 1992; Knobe & Fraser 2008; Hitchcock & Knobe 2009), whether or not
an agent acted freely (Phillips & Knobe 2009), and so on (Pettit & Knobe 2009;
Phillips, Luguri & Knobe 2015).
Our focus here will be on the impact that moral judgments have on assessments
of whether or not an agent was forced to do a given action. The first empirical work
on this topic, Phillips & Knobe 2009, randomly assigned half of participants to read
each of the two variants in the following vignette; the first variant involves a morally
neutral action (throwing cargo overboard) while the second involves a morally bad
action (throwing a person overboard).
(1) [Cargo/Wife] While sailing on the sea, a large storm came upon a captain
and his ship. As the waves began to grow larger, the captain realized that
his small vessel was too heavy and the ship would flood if he didn’t make it
lighter. The only way that the captain could keep the ship from capsizing was
to throw his [wife’s expensive cargo/wife] overboard.
Thinking quickly, the captain took [her cargo/his wife] and tossed [it/her]
into the sea. While the [expensive cargo/captain’s wife] sank to the bottom of
the sea, the captain was able to survive the storm and returned home safely
After reading the vignette, participants in the cargo condition were asked whether
they agreed or disagree with (2).
(2) Cargo: The captain was forced to throw his wife’s cargo overboard.
Participants in the wife condition were likewise asked whether they agreed or
disagree with (3).
(3) Wife: The captain was forced to throw his wife overboard.
Participants’ judgments about whether the ship captain was forced diverged in
the two cases. In the morally permissible (cargo) condition, participants judged
much more that the captain was forced (to throw the cargo overboard) than in the
morally impermissible (wife) condition, where participants were much less inclined
to judge that the ship captain was forced (to throw the passengers overboard). This
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phenomenon, in which people’s assessments of whether someone was forced are
impacted by their moral judgments about the action in question, has been replicated
and extended in a number of different ways (see Young & Phillips 2011; Chakroff &
Young 2015; Phillips et al. 2015).
A promising recent attempt to account for the influence of normative consider-
ations in participants’ assessments of ‘force’ (and more generally), which we will
build on in what follows, is due to Knobe & Szabó 2013, who argue that we can
capture the meaning of the sentences assessed by participants in these studies by
way of a modal proxy. Thus (2) could be understood as contextually equivalent to
(4), and (3) could be understood as contextually equivalent to (5).
(4) Given the circumstances, the captain had to throw the cargo overboard.
(5) Given the circumstances, the captain had to throw his wife overboard.
Knobe and Szabó provide evidence for this claim by replicating the earlier pattern of
results using these proxy sentences. That is, they showed that participants agreed
with (4) but not with (5), similar to the way in which they agreed with (2) but not
(3). Knobe and Szabó then propose an account of the difference in participants’
judgments by way of a semantics of modal auxiliaries, drawing largely on Kratzer
1977, 1981, but argue that the domain of possibilities quantified over by modal
auxiliaries in these cases is of an “impure” flavor, meaning that deontic considerations
partially determine which possibilities are included in the domain. In particular, they
appeal to a principle they call Hope, which ensures that the relevant modal domain
always contains a possibility in which no contextually salient norms are violated. As
they point out, (5) will be false as long as there is some possibility in the domain
in which the contextually salient norm against murder is not violated. By contrast,
this principle will not affect the truth value of (4), since throwing cargo overboard
does not violate a salient norm. Thus, assuming (3) is contextually equivalent to (5)
and (2) is contextually equivalent to (4), Knobe and Szabó are able to derive the
difference in force judgments.
3 Attention affects
We think that Knobe and Szabó’s idea is promising, and we will build on the basic
idea here, trying to refine it in what follows by giving a more explicit semantics for
‘force’ and providing independent evidence that judgments in these cases are indeed
sensitive to quantifier domains. The starting point for our discussion is the striking
discovery from Young & Phillips 2011 that the effect summarized in the last section
is sensitive to whether subjects are presented with an active or a passive variant of
the ‘force’ ascription. For example, Young and Phillips asked participants to read
either the cargo or passenger variant of (6):
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(6) While sailing on the sea, a large storm came upon a captain and his ship.
As the waves began to grow larger, the captain realized that his small vessel
was too heavy and the ship would flood if he didn’t make it lighter. The
only way that the captain could keep the ship from capsizing was to throw
his [expensive cargo/passengers] overboard. Thinking quickly, the captain
ordered one of his sailors to throw the [cargo/passengers] overboard. While
the [cargo/passengers] sank to the bottom of the sea, the captain was able to
survive the storm and returned home safely.
In this scenario, Young and Phillips replicated the basic effect of morality with
questions like (7):
(7) Was the sailor forced to throw the [cargo/passengers] overboard?
That is, as expected, Young and Phillips found that subjects were more inclined to
answer affirmatively to (7) in the cargo condition than in the passenger condition, just
as one would expect given the findings summarized above. Surprisingly, however,
Young and Phillips found no similar effect when they asked participants about (8):
(8) Did the captain force the sailor to throw the [cargo/passengers] overboard?
Rates of affirmative answers to (8) did not vary significantly across the two conditions
(passengers vs. cargo). This is surprising, because (8) is just the active form of the
passive question in (7), and, on the face of it, is intuitively equivalent to it.
It is not immediately clear how Knobe and Szabó’s proposal can on its own
account for this kind of difference. Their Hope principle is meant to be quite general,
and thus one would think participants would be just as unwilling to agree that the
captain forced the sailor to throw the passengers overboard as they are to agree that
the sailor was forced to throw the passengers overboard by the captain; in both cases,
one would expect Hope to require that the domain include possibilities in which the
sailor does not violate the contextually salient norm against murder, and thus one
would not expect participants to agree that the captain forced the sailor to throw the
passengers overboard any more than they agree that the sailor was forced to throw
the passengers overboard.
What then might explain this pattern? One possibility we find promising, fol-
lowing Young and Phillips’ own interpretation of the data, is that the explanation
does not have to do with the particular semantics of the passive, but rather with the
fact that (8) draws attention to the captain more than (7) does. Support for this kind
of explanation of this difference comes from another study reported by Young and
Phillips (2011), in which they varied whether the vignette itself focused participants’
attention on the role of the captain or on the role of the sailor, as in the two versions
of (9).
477
Mandelkern and Phillips
(9) While he was sailing on the sea, a large storm came upon a [sailor/captain]
on a ship. The waves began to grow larger, and the [sailor’s/captain’s] small
vessel was too heavy. The [sailor’s/captain’s] ship would flood and the
[sailor/captain] would drown if he didn’t make it lighter. The only way
that the [sailor/captain] could keep the ship from capsizing was to throw
the passengers overboard. Thinking quickly, the captain of the ship ordered
the sailor to throw the passengers overboard. The sailor threw the passen-
gers overboard. While the passengers sank to the bottom of the sea, the
[sailor/captain] was able to survive the storm and returned home safely.
Participants were observed to agree significantly more with (8) when their attention
had specifically been drawn to the role of the captain rather than the sailor. These
findings fit naturally with an approach to Young and Phillips’ data on which the
key factor affecting the contrast between the active and passive variations has to do
with the change in attention these two constructions naturally bring out between
the forcer and the forcee, respectively. In more detail, we will suggest that drawing
attention to the captain’s causal role in bringing it about that the sailor threw the
[cargo/passengers] overboard makes it more likely that participants take the captain’s
causal influence into account in assessing whether the sailor was forced to act as he
did.
4 Domain expansion
Why does calling attention to the forcer lead to increased agreement with ‘force’
sentences in the immoral (passenger) condition, while calling attention to the forcee
leads to decreased agreement in that condition? This is the question that we will
focus on in the rest of this paper. Our hypothesis is that attentional variation affects
the setting of a quantifier domain which plays a part in the interpretation of ‘force’.
This is a prima facie natural hypothesis given that, in general, drawing attention
to things—objects, possibilities, actions—can change judgments about the truth-
value of sentences that involve quantificational structures. This hypothesis is also
in line with the general strategy pursued by Knobe and Szabó above, on which
modal quantifier domains play a crucial role in explaining the observed judgments.
Importantly, if this claim is right, then it will help resolve the paradox that Young
and Phillips identify regarding the effect of attention on ‘force’ judgments, i.e.,
that participants agree with ‘The captain forced the sailor to throw the passenger
overboard’ while disagreeing with ‘The sailor was forced to throw the passenger
overboard by the captain’. While this combination of attitudes appears inconsistent
at first, if the meaning of these sentences varies with the domain made salient
by context, then it may turn out that there is nothing truly inconsistent about this
combination of judgments.
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Let us begin by considering a few examples that illustrate in a general way the
role of attention in quantifier domain expansion. One place that this kind of effect
can be seen is in the domain of generalized quantifiers like ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘no’, and
so on. Suppose Ted has just finished the last beer in his house; then (10) sounds
reasonable.
(10) There’s no more beer.
Here Ted is only talking about the beer in his house: the domain of his quantifier
ranges only over the things in the house. But now suppose Mark responds with (11):
(11) Sure there is—at the liquor store!
With his response, Mark is calling attention to beer that Ted was (quite reasonably)
neglecting. This response seems to expand the salient domain of quantification for
‘no’. An important feature of cases like this, observed by Lewis (1979), is that once
our attention has been called to the beer in the liquor store, it is no longer easy to
ignore that beer. Ted can complain that Mark’s response is pedantic, unhelpful, and
obnoxious; but it seems difficult, after Mark’s response, for Ted to stand his ground
and insist that (10) is true.
Importantly for present purposes, we find similar effects in broadly modal do-
mains. For instance, in the case of knowledge ascriptions—which, following Hintikka
1962, we can treat as universal quantifiers over a set of possible worlds—simply
drawing attention to skeptical possibilities makes it harder to subsequently ignore
them (and thus harder to subsequently ascribe knowledge; see DeRose 1991; Lewis
1996). Likewise, in the case of conditionals—which, following Stalnaker 1968;
Lewis 1973; Kratzer 1981 are standardly treated as devices for talking about worlds
in a given domain of accessible worlds—calling attention to certain outlying pos-
sibilities makes it harder to subsequently ignore them. A pair of sequences, from
Lewis 1973 (attributed to J. Howard Sobel) and von Fintel 2001 (attributed to Irene
Heim), illustrates this phenomenon nicely:
(12) a. If the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be war.
b. But if the USA and the other nuclear powers all threw their weapons into
the sea tomorrow, there would be peace.
(13) a. If the USA and the other nuclear powers all threw their weapons into the
sea tomorrow, there would be peace.
b. ?? But if the USA threw its weapons into the sea tomorrow, there would be
war.
In the first case, both conditionals sound true. But when the order is reversed in
the second case, so that the outlying possibility of all powers eliminating nuclear
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weapons is raised first, it is harder to then ignore that possibility and hear a true
reading of the second conditional (13b).
A final example, which comes closest to our present topic, concerns judgments
about ability and freedom. Hawthorne (2001) argues that judgments about ability
and freedom are sensitive to domain shifts in similar ways to knowledge ascriptions.
Suppose that John eats a bagel. He says:
(14) I was able to do otherwise than eat a bagel.
There are contexts in which we would naturally judge (14) to be true. But as more
and more of the causal background of John’s actions is made salient, our inclination
to do so somehow diminishes. As Hawthorne puts it:
Were I to have embarked on increasingly philosophical reflection,
noting first the neurological springs of my action and then, indeed,
that my act the laws of nature over which I had no control, coupled
with the distribution of microparticles in the distant past over which
I had no control,. . . I would then find myself in the position where
I could no longer with good conscience ascribe to myself free will
concerning whether or not I had a bagel. As I think harder about
the range of determinants of my action, my inclination to ascribe
freedom of choice to myself withers. (Hawthorne 2001: p. 66-67)
And, intuitively, this kind of domain expansion, once again, seems difficult to reverse:
once we tend to the full range of an action’s causal background, we are less inclined
regard actions as having been done freely.
5 Operationalizing domain expansion
One feature of domain expansion which we find across all these different domains
is its order asymmetry. Across these different domains, it appears to be easier to
expand domains than to shrink them; once a thing or a possibility is made salient, it is
difficult to subsequently ignore it. This characteristic signature of domain expansion
makes it possible to test domain expansion hypotheses in a systematic way. At a
general level, if A and A′ mean the same thing except that A′ expands a quantifier
domain, then, in a sequence of assertions 〈A,A′〉, we predict that rates of agreement
with A will differ from rates of agreement with A′. By contrast, in a sequence 〈A′,A〉,
rates of agreement will stay constant, since the first assertion introduces an expanded
domain which persists for the second. This, in turn, means that we can test quantifier
domain hypotheses by presenting subjects with sequences of this form, and checking
whether we find the expected “sticky” signature of quantifier domain expansion. In
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this section, we use this test to explore whether the variation in judgments of passive
vs. active ‘force’ sentences can be explained by the expansion of a quantifier domain.
5.1 Methods
We tested our quantifier domain hypothesis about ‘force’ by exploring ordinary
judgments in sequences of ‘force’-claims like the following:
(15) 〈passive, active〉:
a. The sailor was forced to throw the [passengers/cargo] overboard by the
captain.
b. The captain forced the sailor to throw the [passengers/cargo] overboard.
(16) 〈active, passive〉:
a. The captain forced the sailor to throw the [passengers/cargo] overboard.
b. The sailor was forced to throw the [passengers/cargo] overboard by the
captain.
If the variation in judgments between active and passive forms is indeed due to
quantifier domain expansion, then we should find evidence for the characteristic
pattern of domain expansion just surveyed: flat judgments at a fixed level d in one
order, and a shift in judgments in the other order, from a first judgment at a level
different from d, to a subsequent judgment close to d.
The predictions, sample size, materials, and analysis plan were all pre-registered
before data were collected (https://aspredicted.org/6qa2t.pdf). All of the data, materi-
als, and analysis code are also available (https://osf.io/crxdq/). We aimed for a sample
size of 800 and recruited 812 participants in total (Mage = 36.65, SDage = 11.89; 483
females, 2 unreported) from Amazon Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com)
(Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling 2011). Participant recruitment was automated
through TurkPrime to prevent repeat participation and limit recruitment to partici-
pants with a previously established high approval rate. Participants were randomly
assigned to read either the passengers or the cargo version of the following scenario:
(17) While sailing on the sea, a large storm came upon a captain and his ship. As
the waves began to grow larger, the captain realized that his small vessel was
too heavy and the ship would flood if he didn’t make it lighter.
The only things on the captain’s small boat were a single sailor, some
small but expensive cargo that he was transporting, and a number of pas-
sengers. He knew he had to throw something overboard to keep the ship
from capsizing. Thinking quickly, the captain ordered the sailor to throw
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the [passengers/cargo] overboard. While the [passengers/cargo] sank to the
bottom of the sea, the captain and his ship survived the storm and returned
home safely.
After reading, participants were sequentially asked to indicate their agreement
with two ‘force’ statements, one passive and the other active—given either in
〈passive, active〉 order, as in (15), or in the 〈active, passive〉 order, as in (16).
In all cases, participants responded on a scale from 0 (‘Disagree’) to 100 (‘Agree’).
They then completed a brief demographic form, and were thanked for their time.
5.2 Results and discussion
We did not exclude any participants from the analysis. Participants’ agreement
ratings were analyzed using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker
et al. 2014) by comparing a series of linear mixed-effects models, with morality
(passengers vs. cargo) and sentence sequence ((15) vs. (16)) as between-subjects
fixed factors, and judgment-order (judged first vs. judged second) as a within-subjects
fixed factor. The significance of the effects was calculated by comparing a model
that included the term in question to a model that differed only in excluding that
term (Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily 2013).
Using this approach, we observed the predicted three-way interaction between
morality, sentence sequence, and judgment order χ2(1) = 31.154, p < .001 (Fig.
(1)). We decomposed this by investigating the relationship between sentence se-
quence and judgment order when the passengers vs. cargo were thrown overboard.
When the passengers were thrown overboard, we observed the hypothesized
interaction between sentence sequence and judgment order, χ2(1) = 28.997, p <
.001. This interaction can be characterized as follows. In the sequence in (15),
participants agreed less with the passive form (judged first) (M = 43.92, SD = 36.2)
than with the active form (judged second) (M = 59.5, SD = 34.0), t(395) =−4.427,
p < .001, d = 0.444. In the sequence in (16), by contrast, there was no significant
difference in agreement with the active form (judged first) (M = 61.1, SD = 35.5)
and the passive form (judged second) (M = 60.9, SD = 35.2), t(399) = 0.061,
p = .952, d = 0.006.
When the cargo was thrown overboard, we observed a weaker interaction be-
tween sentence sequence and judgment order, χ2(1) = 4.093, p = .043. This inter-
action arose from a qualitatively different pattern. In the sequence in (15), partici-
pants agreed more with the passive form of the sentence (judged first) (M = 76.4,
SD = 26.9) than with the active form of the sentence (judged second) (M = 70.7,
SD = 30.9), t(401) = 1.983, p = .048, d = 0.198. In the sequence in (16), there was
again no difference in participants agreement with the the active form (judged first)
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Figure 1 Mean agreement rating with force statements when the passengers (left panel)
or cargo (right panel) were thrown overboard. Within each panel, agreement
with the sentence sequence in (16) is on the left while agreement with the
sequence in (15) is on the right. Color indicates whether the sentence was
judged first (dark bars) or second (light bars). Error bars indicate +/−1 SEM.
(M = 64.4, SD = 31.8) and the passive form (judged second) (M = 62.8, SD = 31.0),
t(406) = 0.493, p = .622, d = 0.049.
Finally, to further characterize the observed effects, we investigated the direction
of the shift in agreement with the passive sentences before vs. after reading the active
sentences. In the passengers conditions, participants less agreed with the passive
form of the sentence before reading the active sentence (M = 43.92, SD = 36.2)
than after reading the active sentence (M = 60.9, SD = 35.2), t(399) = −4.756,
p < .001, d = 0.475. In the cargo conditions, by contrast, participants agreed with
the passive sentence less after reading the active sentence (M = 62.8, SD = 31.0)
than before (M = 76.4, SD = 26.9), t(397.15) = 4.720, p < .001, d = 0.468.
What do these results show? Let us focus first on the passenger scenario. These
results evidence exactly the kind of effect we would expect if a quantifier domain
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expansion hypothesis were correct. Agreement with the ‘force’ sentences is lower
when we start with the passive version, highlighting the sailor’s contribution; it
increases when the captain is subsequently attended to. By contrast, in the reverse,
active-passive, order, agreement is relatively high when the captain is first attended
to, and remains unchanged when we then attend to the sailor; in both cases it
is at roughly the same point as in the active variant of the passive-active order.
This evidences the “sticky” rates of agreement characteristic of quantifier domain
expansion, with the higher agreement, active voice judgments (which focus attention
on the captain) being the stickier ones—and thus the ones that go along with a larger
domain of quantification.
Intriguingly, we don’t find the same pattern in the cargo scenario. Here we
have mid-point agreement with both sentences in the passive-active sequence. In
the active-passive order, we have elevated agreement with the active sentence,
and then slightly lower, but still elevated, agreement with the passive sentence.
Given the relatively small difference between these judgments, it is not exactly
clear how to interpret these data. If there were a clearer contrast across the passive-
active sequence, so that the active variant was closer to the midpoint and thus to
both variants in the active-passive sequence, we would have clearer evidence for a
quantifier domain hypothesis here—but in the opposite direction as in the passenger
case. As things are, however, the evidence in the cargo scenario is unclear.
6 The meaning of ‘force’
In this section, we will take a step back from the experimental data presented so far
and develop a semantics of ‘force’ which we will then argue argue can help us make
sense of those data. In particular, we propose that the following provides a plausible
semantics (we formulate this in the active voice, but we assume that, at a semantic
level, the active and passive formulations are equivalent):
(18) JA forced B to ϕKc,w= 1 iff the following are true in 〈c,w〉:
(i) ‘B did JϕKc’;
(ii) ‘B was unable to refrain from JϕKc’;
(iii) ‘A made (ii) true’; and
(iv) ‘If (ii) had not been true, then B would not have done JϕKc’.
The first clause here ensures that ‘force’ is a success term: if Sue forced John to eat
a cookie, then John must indeed have eaten a cookie. The second clause encodes
the sense of compulsion characteristic of ‘force’ judgments: if Sue forced John to
eat a cookie, then John must have been compelled to eat the cookie; there must be
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a sense in which John was unable to do otherwise than eat the cookie. The third
clause ensures that the forcer played the right kind of role in bringing about this
compulsion: it is because of Sue that John was unable to do otherwise. The role of
the final clause is to rule out Frankfurt-style cases involving ‘force’. Suppose that
Sue ensured that John could not do otherwise than eat a cookie, but John nonetheless
ate a cookie completely of his own accord. In such a case, we do not want to say
he was forced to eat a cookie. The fourth clause ensures that in situations like this,
‘force’ sentences will be false.
We think this provides a plausible first-pass account of the meaning of ‘force’,
and provides a foothold in accounting for the effects of morality on judgments about
force. We think that at least one source of the sensitivity of ‘force’ to morality and
attention comes by way of the second component in the semantics here: ‘force’
entails a lack of ability, and judgments of morality and attention can affect ability
ascriptions. Consider our core scenario. In the cargo condition, we are intuitively
inclined to say that the sailor could not have done otherwise than he did; whereas in
the passenger condition, we are much less inclined to say this. This suggests that
morality has a similar effect on ability ascriptions as on force judgments: we are
more inclined to judge agents to have been unable to do otherwise when what they
do is morally neutral or good than when it is morally bad. This is exactly what we
expect if ‘force’ has roughly the meaning we suggest above and if the influence of
morality on force judgments comes (at least in part) by way of the ability component
of the meaning of ‘force’.
Moreover, the considerations Hawthorne raises provide independent intuitive
evidence that attention can affect judgments about ability. Paying attention to more
of the causal background of a given act can make us less likely to judge the agent
as having been able to do otherwise. And in the passenger case, elevated ‘force’
judgments corresponded with highlighting the causal background of the sailor’s
act—by highlighting the captain’s role in the sailor’s act, through Young and Phillips’
active voice formulation and attention manipulation—suggesting that this may be
just the mechanism that is responsible for the attention effects observed with ‘force’.
We will propose, then, that judgments about ‘able’ vary with a parameter which
we will call a causal background. The causal background is a representation which
keeps track of the causal structure of a given situation. There are different ways we
could spell this out formally. We will use a simple model, in which causes are true
propositions (intuitively, things like the denotation of ‘The captain ordered the sailor
to do such and such’), and the causal background is a set of propositions. In a given
context, we may be happy to ignore certain features of the causal background and
thereby represent agents as free to do other than they did. The more causes we take
account of, however, the less we will be representing agents as free to do otherwise
than they did—right up to Hawthorne’s limiting case in which there is only one
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possibility consistent with the causal background, namely the one in which the agent
does exactly as they in fact did.
There are different ways we could integrate this kind of picture into a semantics
for ‘able’. The simplest approach would be to build on the standard Kratzerian picture
(Kratzer 1977, 1981), and simply treat ‘able’ as a quantifier over the intersection
of the causal background (or some subset thereof). But this approach has two
drawbacks. One is a general concern that treating ‘able’ as an existential quantifier
over worlds in this way gives us implausibly weak truth-conditions for ability
ascriptions; see Mandelkern, Schultheis & Boylan 2017 for an extended recent
discussion.
A more local concern has to do with the ways in which ability ascriptions are
context sensitive. In our discussion above, we noted one way in which ‘able’ is
sensitive to attention in context: drawing attention to an action’s causal background
can suppress agreement with ability judgments, in the way Hawthorne emphasizes.
But there is another way in which ability ascriptions are context sensitive: as Man-
delkern et al. (2017) demonstrates, drawing attention to certain actions can increase
agreement with ability judgments. To see the point, suppose that Sue is planning to
go to dinner with her friends. Ann says:
(19) Can you go to a movie tonight?
It’s very natural for Sue to respond ‘No, I can’t; I have dinner plans’. But now suppose
that Ann replies: ‘So what? You could just cancel those plans and come to the movie.
So you can go to the movie.’ Once Ann has made this possibility salient, it becomes
much harder for Sue to stand by her claim that she can’t go. This case suggests
that domain expansion in the case of ability ascriptions can go in two directions:
while, as we saw above, calling attention to the causal background of some action
can durably depress agreement with ability ascriptions, calling attention to certain
actions available to an agent can durably elevate agreement with ability ascriptions.
And moreover, intuitively, both kinds of change are sticky in the way characteristic
of quantifier domain expansion. This suggests that there are two different roles for
domains of quantification in ability judgments: one domain which represents the
causal background and suppresses agreement with ability ascriptions as it grows;
and one which represents contextually available actions and increases agreement
with ability ascriptions as it grows.
We can capture this by building on the framework developed in Mandelkern
et al. 2017. In that framework, pS is able to ϕq is evaluated relative to a set of actions
A , and is true just in case there is some action A in A , such that if S tried to do
A, she would do ϕ . What set of actions A amounts to is determined by context
(Mandelkern et al. call this the set of practically available actions); importantly,
expanding that set of actions will elevate agreement with ability ascriptions, since it
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will expand the possible paths for S to do ϕ that we are treating as salient in a given
context. This account thus nicely captures the second kind of domain-sensitivity we
explored just now. To capture the first kind, we can distinguish a separate parameter
which represents the context’s causal background, and which provides the building
blocks for the practically available actions. More formally, let C denote the causal
background—again, a set of propositions representing the salient causal structure
of the situation in question. We can then think of
⋂
C as the building blocks for
A : A will be a set of propositions whose elements are all in
⋂
C . Then, crucially,
as C grows—as we take into account more of the causal background—A will
correspondingly generally shrink, as we exclude from
⋂
C worlds that were in
elements of A . And so, while expanding the set of practically available actions will
durably elevate agreement with ability ascriptions, expanding the causal background
by attending to more of the causal structure of a given situation will durably depress
agreement with ability ascriptions.
Putting these pieces together formally: where℘(
⋂
Cc,w) is the powerset of the
intersection of the causal background Cc,w at a given context c and world w, and fc
is the contextual selection function from Stalnaker (1968)’s theory of conditionals,
which takes a proposition and a world to the “closest” world where that proposition
is true:
(20) JS is able to ϕKc,w
a. is defined only if Ac,w ⊆℘(⋂Cc,w);
b. where defined, is true iff ∃A ∈ Ac,w such that fc(S tries to do A,w) ∈JS does ϕKc,w
Informally, pS is able to ϕq is true just in case there is some practically available
action which entails everything in the causal background, and which is such that if S
tries to do that action, she does ϕ .
Mandelkern et al. (2017) motivate the core truth conditions given in (20b), and
we won’t focus on them here. What is important for present purposes is that this
approach captures the dual roles of domain expansion in ability ascriptions. On the
one hand, attending to more causal background, as in Hawthorne’s fatalistic reverie,
will expand the causal background and thus shrink the set of practically available
actions. This will reduce the number of possible ways we take into account when
thinking about whether the agent could bring about ϕ—and thus durably diminishing
agreement with ability ascriptions. In the limiting case—determinism—the causal
background includes every causal factor that constrained the agent’s action, resulting
in it being the case that the only practically available action is what the agent actually
did. On the other hand, directly attending to certain actions, as in Ann’s reply ‘So
what? You could just cancel those plans and come to the movie’, can expand the
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range of actions we treat as practically available. This will increase the number of
possible ways we take into account when thinking about whether the agent could
bring about ϕ , and thereby durably increase agreement with ability ascriptions.
7 Explaining our data
With these semantics in hand for ‘force’ and ‘able’, let us revisit the experimental
results discussed in the first part of the paper. First, to explain the basic effect
of morality, we will assume that something along the lines of what Knobe and
Szabó proposed is correct, appropriately generalized to the present framework.
That is, we assume that subjects generally work with a causal background whose
intersection includes possibilities in which people do the right thing—and thus with
corresponding sets of actions which include actions which do not violate moral
norms. This means that in cases like the passenger scenario above, subjects will be
less likely to take into account the full causal background which led the sailor to
throw the passengers overboard, and they will be more likely to include actions in
the set of practically available actions in which the sailor does something other than
what he actually did, than in the cargo scenario.
But this tendency to treat agents as free to do morally good acts can run against
a countervailing tendency when we call attention to more of the causal background
in a given situation. In particular, highlighting the captain’s causal role in bringing
about the sailor’s action—for instance, by using the active voice, or highlighting the
captain when describing the scenario—will tend to make us more likely to include
in the causal background propositions that capture the captain’s causal role: e.g., the
propositions that the captain ordered the sailor to throw the passengers overboard,
that the captain was a superior to the sailor, and so on. Given our semantics for ‘able’
above, this in turn will make us less likely to treat the sailor as able to have done
otherwise than he in fact did. And, given our semantics for ‘force’, that, in turn,
will make us more likely to say that the sailor was forced to do what he did: for
on our semantics for ‘force’, ‘The captain forced the sailor to throw the passengers
overboard’ can only be true if the sailor was not able to do otherwise than throw the
passengers overboard. In short, decreasing agreement with ‘The sailor was able to do
otherwise than throw the passengers overboard’ by expanding the causal background
will increase agreement with its negation, and thus tend to increase agreement with
the corresponding ‘force’-claim.
This provides an account of the attention effects in the passenger case, and it
also predicts the order effects we observed above. If quantifier domain expansion is
sticky, then expanding the causal background will lead to durably lower agreement
with ability ascriptions, and thus to durably higher agreement with force ascriptions.
And this is just what we observe: if we first focus attention on the sailor and then
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focus attention on the captain, we see an increase across the sequence in rates
of agreement; whereas if we start by focusing attention on the captain and then
subsequently focus on the sailor, we start from the beginning with relatively high
rates of agreement in the ‘force’-claim, and this stays stable across the sequence.
As we saw above, we do not find similar order effects in the cargo case. A natural
explanation of this is that in the cargo case, we are less likely to be ignoring the
captain’s causal role in the first place, and so calling attention to the captain does
not change judgments in the same way. As we noted above, there is variation in
the judgments in the cargo case. They seem to be consistent with quantifier domain
variation, but are nowhere near as clear as the pattern in the passenger case, and go
in the opposite direction. We do not see a natural way to tell a quantifier domain
story about these judgments. Another possibility is that the differences in judgments
observed here has to do with independent factors having to do with the questions
made salient by active vs. passive formulations and the meaning of ‘force’, but not
to do with quantifier domains. More work is needed on this topic.
8 Conclusion
It is now well-known that morality exerts a surprising influence on judgments about
ostensibly non-moral domains such as intentionality, causality, and compulsion. In
this paper we sought to make progress on understanding morality’s influence by
exploring subtle judgments about whether an agent was forced to do what they did.
In particular, we have focused on Young & Phillips (2011)’s surprising finding that
variation in whether the ‘force’-claims in question are formulated in the active or
passive voice modulates morality’s impact. We have argued that this modulation
has to do with the influence of attention—which can be affected by active/passive
variation, as well as by manipulating who the scenario focuses on—on a quantifier
domain which affects the interpretation of ‘force’. We presented an experiment which
showed that sequences of active versus passive ‘force’ judgments show exactly the
classic sticky pattern we expect of quantifier domain expansion. We argued that the
interpretation of ‘force’ depends in part on a causal background which keeps track
of the causal structure of a given scenario; the more causes we take into account, the
more we will judge someone to have been forced to do what they did. This provides
us with the resources to make sense of the effect of attention on ‘force’ judgments in
immoral cases.
In concluding, we want to step back and emphasize some of the more general
upshots of our exploration. One concerns moral psychology. How should we think
about the participants who show are less inclined to accept ‘The sailor was forced to
throw the passengers overboard by the captain’ than ‘The captain forced the sailor
to throw the passengers overboard’? One perspective, which Young and Phillips
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embrace, is that this inclination amounts to an ‘internal error’, landing us amidst
‘logical inconsistencies’. We have suggested a different way of thinking about this
inclination. On our proposal, the results in question do not point to logical inconsis-
tencies in participants’ judgments. Rather, participants in the two conditions—active
vs. passive voice—are evaluating different contents, made prominent by changes in
the information structure of the sentences which affect context-sensitive terms like
‘force’, and there is nothing inconsistent about having different attitudes towards
those different contents. On this alternative perspective, it would be wrong to regard
the observed sensitivity to morality and attention as fundamentally erroneous.
Of course, we might still conclude that the observed sensitivity to morality and
attention is rationally suboptimal. We could try to imagine an agent whose concepts
of intsentional action, causation, or compulsion were not sensitive to morality or
attention. Perhaps such an agent would have one up on us rationality-wise. But
perhaps not: the forms of moral context-sensitivity we have observed in natural
language may turn out to be perfectly rational once one takes into account humans’
fundamentally social nature and their limited capacity to represent and reason over
non-actual possibilities (Phillips & Knobe 2018; Phillips & Cushman 2017; Shtulman
& Phillips 2018). This is a central question which moral psychology must grapple
with.
A second upshot is for experimental semantics and pragmatics. It is difficult to
find grounds to argue that some set of judgments is a feature of context sensitivity
rather than simple inconsistency or irrationality. In this paper, we have operational-
ized a well-known intuitive observation about quantifier domain expansion—its
stickiness—showing that this feature can provide the foundations for experimental
investigation of whether a given phenomenon is indeed due to changes in some
domain of quantification. Specifically, the stickiness of quantifier domain expansion
provides a characteristic signature in rates of agreement across sequences of the form
〈A,A′〉 and 〈A′,A〉, respectively. Investigating sequences of this form should provide
a solid foundation for claims about quantifier domain expansion well beyond the
present inquiry. This, in turn, raises an important theoretical question which, to our
knowledge, remains open, namely why quantifier domains are sticky in this way.
This question is important for understanding why the present paradigm works, and,
we suspect, for better understanding the nature and sources of context-sensitivity
and the cognitive effects of attention in general; it is just one of many important
questions we leave open here.
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